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Abstract—MANET routing protocols have many vulnerabil-
ities that may be exploited by malicious nodes to disrupt the
normal routing behavior. In this paper, we present a vulnerability
analysis of AODV. We simulate four routing attacks to analyse
their impacts on AODV protocol using NS-2 network simulator.
These attacks are blackhole, grayhole, selfish and flooding attacks.
The blackhole and flooding attacks have a severe impact on the
network performance while the selfish and grayhole attacks have
less significant effect on the network performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a decentralized
infrastructureless network in which nodes cooperate to forward
data from a source to a destination. Each node in a MANET
acts both as a router and as a host.
Several routing protocols have been designed for MANETs
[3] to optimize network routing performance over the past
years. The major issues involved in designing a routing pro-
tocol for MANET are nodes mobility, bandwidth constrained
and error prone wireless channel, resource constrained nodes,
and dynamic changing of the network topology.
MANET routing protocols can be classified as proactive or
reactive routing protocols. In proactive (table-driven) routing
protocols, each node maintains one or more tables containing
routing information to every other node in the network. While
in reactive (on-demand) routing protocols, routes are created
whenever a source requires to send data to a destination node
which means that these protocols are initiated by a source on-
demand. In this paper, we concentrate on the AODV protocol
[10]. AODV is a reactive protocol, chosen by the IETF for
standardization, which has been extensively studied.
Conventional MANET routing protocols assume that all
nodes cooperate without maliciously disrupting the operation
of the protocol and do not provide defense against malicious
attackers. However, the existence of malicious nodes cannot be
ignored in computer networks, especially in MANETs because
of the wireless nature of the network. MANET inherits security
threats that are faced in wired as well as wireless networks
and also introduces security attacks unique to itself [6] due its
characteristics. Nodes in MANET have limited computation
and power capabilities that make the network more vulnerable
to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. It is difficult to implement
cryptography and key management algorithms which need
high computations like public key algorithms. Node mobility
introduces also a difficulty of distinguishing between stale
routes and fake routes. A malicious node can attack the
network layer in MANET either by not forwarding packets
or by changing some parameters of routing messages such
as sequence number and IP addresses, sending fake messages
several times and sending fake routing information to disrupt
routing operations. There are a large number of existing attacks
against MANET [12] and solutions to these attacks. Simulation
and study of such attacks [9] [13] has become necessary in
order to provide defence mechanisms against these types of
attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
an overview of the AODV routing protocol is presented and
the impact of some attacks on MANET is discussed. In section
III, the simulation parameters and results are given. In section
IV concluding remarks are introduced.
II. AODV PROTOCOL AND SECURITY FLAWS
Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector Routing (AODV) [10] is a
reactive routing protocol. It uses destination sequence numbers
to ensure the freshness of routes and guarantee loop freedom.
To find a path to a destination, a node broadcasts a route
request (RREQ) packet to its neighbors using a new sequence
number. Each node that receives the broadcast sets up a reverse
route towards the originator of the RREQ unless it has a
fresher one. When the intended destination or an intermediate
node that has a fresh route to the destination receives the
RREQ, it unicasts a reply by sending a route reply (RREP)
packet along the reverse path established at intermediate nodes
during the route discovery process. Then the source node
starts sending data packets to the destination node through the
neighboring node that first responded with an RREP. When
an intermediate node along the route moves, its upstream
neighbor will notice route breakage due to the movement and
propagate a route error (RERR) packet to each of its active
upstream neighbors. Routing information is stored only in the
source node, the destination node, and the intermediate nodes
along the active route which deal with data transmission. This
scenario decreases the memory overhead, minimizes the use
of network resources, and runs well in high mobility situation.
The behavior of a malicious node is to disrupt the operation
of the AODV routing protocol [6]. The malicious node can
spoof source or destination IP address, modify RREQ or
RREP packets and/or generate fake RREP or RERR packets.
Some of the attacks such as blackhole and grayhole attack
are discovered by the source node in connection-oriented
protocols such as TCP because the lack of acknowledgments.
The source node understands that there is a link error because
the destination node does not send ACK packets. If the source
node sends out UDP data packets the problem is not detected
because UDP is a connectionless protocol.
A. Flooding Attack on AODV
In a flooding attack [5], a malicious node takes advantage
of the route discovery process of the AODV routing protocol.
The malicious node aims to flood the network with a large
number of RREQs to non-existent destinations in the network
which takes a lot of the network resources. Since the desti-
nation does not exist in the network, a RREP packet cannot
be generated by any node in the network and all the nodes
keep on flooding the RREQ packet. When a large number of
fake RREQ packets are broadcast into the network, new routes
can no longer be added and the network is unable to transmit
data packets. Thus, it leads to congestion in the network and
overflow of route table in the intermediate nodes so that the
nodes cannot receive new RREQ packet, resulting in a DoS
attack. Moreover, unnecessary forwarding of these fake RREQ
packets has serious effects in MANET [2] as a result of limited
computational and power resources of nodes.
However, the AODV protocol can mitigate against this
attack by reducing the maximum number of RREQs that a
node allowed to send per second.
B. Selfish Attack on AODV
In MANETs the nodes cooperate to forward data and
routing packets from one node to another node. A selfish
node is the node that saves its resources; such as battery,
by not cooperating in the network operations. A selfish node
affects the network performance as it does not correctly process
routing or data packets based on the routing protocol. The
selfish node behavior is known as a selective existence attack
[4]. Selective existence is kind of a passive attack as the node
neither participates in the network operation nor changes the
content of packets.
The selfish node does not even send any HELLO messages
and drops all data and control packets even if these packets
are sent to it. When a selfish node needs to send data to
another node, it starts working as normal AODV operation.
After it finishes sending its data, the node returns to its silent
mode and the selfish behavior by dropping all data and routing
packets directed through it. Neighbor nodes detect the absence
of the selfish node after an interval of silence, and will assume
that the node has left their neighborhood. So, they invalidate
their own route entries to this node and selfish node becomes
invisible to the network.
C. Grayhole Attack on AODV
In a grayhole attack [7], a malicious node behaves normally
as a truthful node during the route discovery process by
replying with true RREP messages to the nodes that started
RREQ messages. After the source node starts sending data
through the malicious node, the malicious node starts dropping
these data packets to launch a (DoS) denial of service attack.
So, the malicious node forwards routing packets and drops
data packets. This selective dropping makes grayhole attacks
much more difficult to detect than blackhole attacks. Grayhole
attack is also known as node misbehaving attack [1] as the
malicious node misleads the network by agreeing to forward
the packets in the network.
D. Blackhole Attack on AODV
In a blackhole attack [11], a malicious node absorbs the
network traffic and drops all packets. To carry out a blackhole
attack, a malicious node waits for incoming RREQ packets
from other nodes. When the malicious node receives an RREQ
message, without checking its routing table, it immediately
sends a false RREP with a high sequence number and zero
hop count to spoof its neighbours that it has the best route to
the destination. Thus, the malicious node reply will be received
by the source node before any reply from other nodes. When a
source node receives multiple RREP, it chooses the RREP with
the largest destination sequence number and the smallest hop
count. Then the source node ignores other RREP packets and
begins sending data packets over the malicious node. When
the data packets routed by the source node reach the blackhole
node, it drops the packets rather than forwarding them to the
destination node.
The malicious node attacks all RREQ packets in this way
and takes over all routes. Therefore all packets are sent to a
point where they are not forwarding anywhere. If the malicious
node generates false RREP messages that appear to come from
another victim node, all messages will be forwarded to the
victim node. By doing this, victim node will have to process
all incoming messages and is subjected to a sleep deprivation
attack.
III. ATTACK SIMULATIONS
We simulated various attacks on the AODV protocol using
the ns-2 simulator [8]. The parameters used are shown in Table
I. Node mobility was modelled with the random waypoint
method. Each configuration was repeated 12 times. We found
that the effect of the pause times used, (0, 10, 20, and
30 seconds) had little effect on the results, so the points
representing the results for any particular speed are the mean
of the 48 runs, ignoring the pause time. In all cases, the 90%
confidence interval was small compared with the values being
reported.
While we examined the effects of the attacks on both UDP
and TCP traffic, we focused in this paper on their impact on
the TCP traffic only. The major difference between TCP and
UDP is that the source node keeps on sending UDP packets,
even if the malicious node drops them, while it closes the
connection after a while if it uses TCP protocol because of not
receiving the TCP ACK packet. Although both types of traffic
report throughputs, they are not directly comparable, because
UDP traffic that is lost is ignored - each packet is treated
independently. TCP packets that are lost will be retransmitted
by the protocol, and TCP also adapts to the throughput it is
achieving using a feedback algorithm. The throughput of UDP
can be compared directly with the offered traffic and should
match the packet loss rate. In TCP packet loss will have a
feedback effect and restrict future transmission rates, but the
actual lost packet will be retransmitted. In addition, the data
sending rate of UDP can be controlled using simulation which
is not valid in TCP. Thus packet loss and throughput for the
two protocols are not directly comparable. Furthermore we
would like to see the effect of these attacks on sending data
which will be evaluated in TCP connection only. The metrics
used to evaluate the performance are given below.
TABLE I. SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation Time 180 s
Simulation Area 1000 m x 1000 m
Number of Nodes 100
Number of Connections 70
Number of Malicious Nodes 0 - 5
Node Speed 0 - 30 m/s
Pause Time 0 - 30 s
Traffic Type CBR - TCP
CBR Rate 4 packets/s
Throughput: This is the number of data bits delivered to the
application layer of destination node in unit time measured in
bps.
End-to-End Delay: This is the average time taken for a packet
to be transmitted across the network from source to destination.
Routing Overhead: This is the number of routing packets
for route discovery and route maintenance needed to send to
deliver the data packets from sources to destinations.
Route Discovery Latency (RDL): This is the average delay
between the sending RREQ from a source and receiving the
first corresponding RREP.
A. Flooding Attack on AODV
Fig. 1 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the network
throughput when the node mobility is increased. The result
shows that the throughput decreases by 10% for each malicious
node introduced in the network. This is independent of the
node mobility.
The effect of malicious nodes on the end-end-delay when
the node mobility is increased is shown in Fig. 2. The result
shows that the delay increases as more malicious nodes are
added in the network, independent of the node speed.
Fig. 3 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the routing
overhead when the node mobility is increased. The result
shows that the routing overhead increases 25% in the average
as the number of malicious nodes in the network increases.
The effect of malicious nodes on the routing discovery
latency when the node mobility is increased is shown in Fig. 4.
The result shows that in a static network, the RDL increases
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Fig. 1. Throughput under Flooding Attack
43% for the first malicious node and after that it increases
about 27% in the average for each extra malicious node in the
network. It is interesting to observe that when the nodes move
at all, the malicious nodes have almost no effect on RDL.
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Fig. 2. Average End-End-Delay under Flooding Attack
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Fig. 3. Routing Overhead under Flooding Attack
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Fig. 4. Routing Discovery Latency under Flooding Attack
B. Selfish Attack on AODV
Fig. 5 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the network
throughput when the node mobility is increased. The result
shows that the malicious nodes do not have a significant effect
on the network throughput.
Fig. 6 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the end-
end-delay when the node mobility is increased. The result
shows that the delay increases up to 10% in the average as the
number of malicious nodes increases for low mobility networks
while decreases up to same percentage for the high mobility
networks.
The effect of malicious nodes on the routing overhead when
the node mobility is increased is shown in Fig. 7. The result
shows that the routing overhead decreases up to 6% in the
average while increasing the number of malicious nodes in
low speed nodes. This percentage rises to 15% in high speed
nodes.
Fig. 8 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the routing
discovery latency when the node mobility is increased. The
result shows that the existence of the first two malicious nodes
does not have a major difference in the RDL of routes while
the effect becomes remarkable with the existence of any other
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Fig. 7. Routing Overhead under Selfish Attack
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Fig. 8. Routing Discovery Latency under Selfish Attack
malicious nodes.The latency in routes discovery increases up
to 65% related to the latency time of the AODV without any
malicious nodes.
C. Grayhole Attack on AODV
As the grayhole node drops all data packets and the selfish
node drops all data and routing packets, the grayhole attack
simulation introduces very similar results to the selfish attack.
This is because of the network throughput, end-end-delay
and routing overheads are calculated based on the received
data packets which are the unique for the same simulation
scenario. The only major difference between simulation results
of grayhole attack and selfish attack is in the RDL. Fig. 9
shows the effect of malicious nodes on the routing discovery
latency when the node mobility is increased. The result shows
that the RDL increases up to 20% for static nodes while
decreases up to 40% for high mobility nodes.
D. Blackhole Attack on AODV
Fig. 10 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the network
throughput when the node mobility is increased. The result
shows that the throughput dramatically decreases 13% with
the existence of first malicious node and then the throughput
decreases with an average 13% for each malicious node.
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Fig. 10. Throughput under Blackhole Attack
The effect of malicious nodes on the end-end-delay when
the node mobility is increased is shown in Fig. 11. The result
shows that the delay decreases as the number of malicious
nodes in the network increases. This results seems to be
unexpected specially if we notice that the same experiment
increases the delay for the UDP protocol. The reason of
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Fig. 11. Average End-End-Delay under Blackhole Attack
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Fig. 13. Routing Discovery Latency under Blackhole Attack
unexpected TCP results may because the existence of the ACK
packet which closes the connection if not received within the
timeout as specified in TCP. This needs more investigation in
future work.
Fig. 12 shows the effect of malicious nodes on the routing
overhead when the node mobility is increased. The result
shows that the routing overhead increases 27% for the first
malicious node while the other malicious nodes have not a
large significant effect on routing overhead while increasing
the number of malicious nodes in the network.
The effect of malicious nodes on the routing discovery
latency when the node mobility is increased is shown in Fig.
13. The result shows that the RDL decreases to approximately
60% in the average while increasing the number of malicious
nodes in the network.
The simulation results show as well that the grayhole
and selfish attacks have a negative impact on the number of
dropped packets. The number of dropped packets relative to the
number of malicious nodes for each attack is shown in Fig.
14. The attack type also affects the number of data packets
that can be sent during the simulation time. Fig. 15 shows that
the blackhole and the flooding attacks affect dramatically the
number of data packets sent during the simulation time.
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As we mentioned before, we used both TCP and UDP
traffic to evaluate the impact of these attacks on both types
of connections. From the simulation we found that the effect
of these attacks is very similar in both of these protocols. As
an example, Fig. 16 shows the effect of malicious nodes on
the network throughput when the node mobility is increased
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Fig. 16. Throughput under Blackhole Attack using CBR Traffic
using CBR traffic. We can notice that this figure is close to
the Fig. 10 which shows the effect of malicious nodes on the
network throughput using TCP traffic.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyse the impact of some of the attacks
on the AODV routing protocol. The flooding, selfish, grayhole
and blackhole attacks are simulated using NS-2 network sim-
ulator to study their effects on the performance metrics such
as network throughput, end-end-delay, routing overhead and
routing discovery latency.
From the simulation, we conclude that the blackhole and
flooding attacks have dramatic impact on throughput, end-
end-delay and routing overhead. Selfish and grayhole attacks
do not affect so much in these metrics because both attacks
drop the data packets which are the major factor in calculating
these metrics. While selfish and grayhole attack share the data
dropping, the blackhole introduce a fake RREP which affects
the network performance and the flooding attack introduces a
fake RREQ which affects the network performance as well.
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